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Abstract 21 
 22 
 2
Acts of prosociality, such as donating to charity, are often analyzed similarly as acts of 23 
conspicuous advertising; both involve costly signals revealing hidden qualities that increase 24 
the signaller's prestige. However, experimental work suggests that grand gestures, even if 25 
prosocial, may damage one's reputation for trustworthiness and cooperativeness if they are 26 
perceived as prestige-enhancing: individuals may gain some types of cooperative benefits 27 
only when they perform prosocial acts in particular ways. Here, we contrast subtle, less 28 
obviously costly, interpersonal forms of prosocial behaviour with high cost displays to a 29 
large audience, drawing on the example of food sharing in subsistence economies. This 30 
contrast highlights how highly visible prosocial displays may be effective for attracting new 31 
partners, while subtle signals may be crucial for ensuring trust and commitment with long-32 
term partners. Subtle dyadic signals may be key to understanding the long-term 33 
maintenance of interpersonal networks that function to reduce unanticipated risks. 34 
 35 
 36 
The many dilemmas of cooperation 37 
 38 
The problem of cooperation is commonly framed by the Prisoner's Dilemma, which asks 39 
how cooperation is sustained between individuals who each stand to gain more from not 40 
cooperating. In the classic telling, two miscreants are interrogated by the police and faced 41 
with the temptation to testify against one another. However, before they were arrested and 42 
given the chance to defect, they had already grappled with another dilemma: whom to 43 
choose as a partner in crime. In real social situations, individuals typically are first faced with 44 
the choice of whom to interact with, as well as with the possibility of repeated interactions 45 
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with the same individual. Consequently, research on cooperation has increasingly focused on 46 
the dilemma of how to choose the best attainable partner from a set of possible partners of 47 
differing qualities1–7, and how existing partners might demonstrate continued commitment 48 
to a mutually beneficial relationship8–12.  49 
 50 
When partner choice is the goal, individuals should be evaluating not only the quality of 51 
potential partners (which we narrowly define here as the quantity of benefits they can 52 
provide), but also the likelihood that those benefits would flow to them; that is, properties 53 
of relations should be evaluated as well as properties of individuals. A partner's perceived 54 
availability and cooperative tendencies are critical for imparting confidence in what future 55 
interactions with that individual will entail, and may sometimes be more important in 56 
shaping partner choice than partner quality13: a rich but greedy partner might be a poorer 57 
collaborator than a poor but generous one. Experimental research suggests that individuals 58 
looking for a cooperative partnership are often more sensitive to a partner's fairness than to 59 
quality, preferring fair partners over stingy ones even if they are poorer, especially when 60 
individual quality fluctuates over time14,15. Empirical observations in subsistence-based 61 
economies echo these experimental studies, showing that those who are more generous, 62 
but not those who are more productive per se, seem to reap the benefits of future 63 
cooperative rewards16–18 (see Box 1).  64 
 65 
Individuals also face decisions about whether to maintain existing relationships or invest in 66 
new ones, and therefore individuals should also be interested in assessing how committed 67 
their potential or current partners are to the relationship. There are also likely to be real 68 
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constraints on switching partners, including the cost of gathering information on potential 69 
partners, limits on the number of potential partners available, and trade-offs between the 70 
number of partnerships and the quality of relationships an individual can maintain. In 71 
making the choice to stick with an existing partner, the level of that partner's commitment 72 
to the relationship—the likelihood that benefits will flow to you, and not to someone else—73 
is a critical piece of information13. Clearly, individuals want to avoid the possibility that their 74 
partners will abandon them, and should want evidence that their partners are willing to 75 
provide ongoing help to them specifically.  76 
 77 
While cooperative partnerships can be utilized for a wide range of endeavours, the incentive 78 
to maintain partnerships may often stem not from the simple desire for eventual 79 
reciprocation, or from the need to accomplish a particular cooperative task, but from the 80 
broader value of long-term, committed relationships for coping with unanticipated events. 81 
While any one interaction may provide an immediate benefit, cooperative partnerships 82 
should be seen as broadly contributing to long-term strategies of building social capital: the 83 
resources embedded in a person’s social network19,20. The long-term benefits of such 84 
relationships are clearly demonstrated by the large literature documenting the positive 85 
relationship between social support and health and well-being, both in humans21–26 and 86 
non-human primates27–30.  87 
 88 
Building relationships through subtle signals 89 
 90 
Making the right decisions about relationship investment is dependent upon being able to  91 
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access accurate information. Honest signalling by both parties is thus critical both in 92 
perceiving an individual’s quality (how much a partner might be able to help) and in 93 
establishing that individual’s commitment to the relationship and probability of helping 94 
(how much to trust in their other-regarding motivations and reliability). Signalling theory 95 
helps to explain how and under what circumstances honesty in communication can be 96 
maintained when there are conflicts of interest and temptations to defect31–33. Developed in 97 
biology as the ‘handicap principle’34, wherein signals are designed to reveal the hidden 98 
qualities of an individual important for mate choice, predator evasion, or hunting skill, 99 
signalling theory is most strongly associated with costly acts revealing one’s intrinsic but 100 
hidden qualities.  101 
 102 
Signalling may be integral to explaining cooperation when signals take the form of costly 103 
and often public acts that serve to benefit others35,36. Most work on signalling and 104 
cooperation sees prosocial (or altruistic) signals as conveying something about the intrinsic 105 
quality of the signaller. Donations to a public charity, for example, might reveal the wealth 106 
and prosociality of the donor. Providing a large quantity of food or rare food items for a 107 
feast might reveal something about a hunter’s ability. Having observed such signals, people 108 
can better assess the qualities of potential cooperators. In such cases, signallers may wish to 109 
draw the attention of a large audience, as a highly visible, broadcast signal allows more 110 
people to observe it and draw inferences about the suitability of the signaller as a mate or 111 
cooperative partner, or of their formidability as a competitor36. However, as mentioned 112 
earlier, individuals may want to assess not only properties of an individual, but also the 113 
probable properties of a relationship with that individual, such as their availability for and 114 
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commitment to a particular relationship. While some dramatic broadcast signals may 115 
provide clear evidence of the signaller’s ability to provide a benefit, they may be less 116 
convincing of the signaller’s willingness or interest to provide those benefits to specific 117 
individuals. This type of “public prosocial signal”—grand displays broadcast to a large 118 
audience—might then do little to reassure any specific onlooker that they are the intended 119 
target of the signal.  120 
 121 
The prominence of public prosocial signals means that these signals can easily be viewed 122 
with scepticism, seen as a selfish attempt to build renown rather than as an act of 123 
commitment to others. Public prosocial signals may also be seen as advertising one’s quality 124 
to others in order to find new cooperative partners, which may undermine the confidence of 125 
existing partners in an individual’s commitment to them. Consequently, signal observers in 126 
many contexts tend to discount prosocial acts when the actor stands to gain directly via 127 
material benefits, or indirectly from improved social status37–41. The scepticism of public 128 
prosocial signals extends to subtle considerations of whether or not individuals are acting 129 
strategically to advance their own best interests rather than the mutual interests of 130 
cooperators. For example, partners in a trust game are more willing to trust naïve individuals 131 
who are generous playing a dictator game than individuals who are similarly generous in 132 
the dictator game but who are informed that their initial generosity could be advantageous 133 
later42. Signallers can work to reduce scepticism through a variety of mechanisms, such as 134 
the signaller distancing him or herself from the act by remaining anonymous, using 135 
intermediaries to distribute goods and services, or distributing in ways that make it clear 136 
that reciprocation is not expected18. However, the potential tradeoff between the immediate 137 
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personal gains for such acts and the longer-term value of a committed relationship will 138 
remain.  139 
 140 
The solution to this dilemma may lie in the use of prosocial signals that are either subtle 141 
(meaning, more discreet, rather than dramatic and flashy) and/or dyadic (directed to 142 
particular individuals, rather than broadcast widely). Such signals are prevalent, and 143 
potentially quite important communicative acts. For instance, Silk43 contrasts loud primate 144 
vocalizations that attract wide attention, such as warning calls, and quiet vocalizations that 145 
are used to indicate intentions and dispositions towards particular others. Subtle and dyadic 146 
signals have a number of characteristics that may make them particularly effective for 147 
maintaining cooperative partnerships and affiliative social bonds. With subtle prosocial 148 
signals, the observer’s awareness that others are not similarly attentive to the signal 149 
prevents scepticism that the act is being undertaken for individual aggrandizement. With 150 
dyadic prosocial signals, the signallers’ direct investment in a particular individual’s well-151 
being (as opposed to an investment in others) assures the recipient/observer that the 152 
signaller wishes to engage in a mutually-beneficial relationship. Investment in the well-being 153 
of another, when accompanied by a manner of acting which demonstrates there are no 154 
expectations of direct, in-kind reciprocation, allows the observer to trust that the signaller 155 
actually does have her best interests at heart, and is not simply giving in order to get 156 
something in return18.  Indeed, strict account keeping and contingent behavior is often 157 
detrimental to the relationship44. Observer confidence in the honesty of these signals is also 158 
buttressed by a number of other reliability mechanisms that go well beyond simple signal 159 
costs45–48. When individuals have a long history of repeated interaction, for example, each 160 
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partner has ample opportunity to directly observe the actions of the other, and evaluate 161 
their honesty49. Over time, each partner's continued investment in the relationship may also 162 
mean that their interests become more closely aligned, reducing their temptation to renege. 163 
Consequently, subtle dyadic prosocial signals, with their frequent, repeated, low cost 164 
demonstrations of a continued investment in the relationship, may most unambiguously 165 
provide reliable information of an individual’s value as a friend or collaborator.  166 
 167 
Both subtle, dyadic signals and dramatic, broadcast signals can take the form of other-168 
regarding, non-contingent behaviours through which signallers may attempt to generate 169 
and maintain cooperative relationships with others. However, these signal forms may play 170 
different roles in supporting different types of cooperation. Public prosocial signals 171 
(dramatic, broadcast signals) may be particularly important in the task of recruiting new 172 
partners through reputation-building50,51, while subtle, dyadic prosocial acts may be 173 
important for reaffirming and strengthening existing relationships. Because individuals 174 
generally interact on multiple occasions and in multiple settings, dyadic and broadcast 175 
signals may not be evaluated entirely independently of each other. When broadcast signals 176 
are consistently reinforced by subtle, dyadic signals of commitment and generosity, the two 177 
signal forms can reduce the scepticism with which public prosocial signals are viewed. 178 
However, while these two signal forms may often have reinforcing messages of a signaller’s 179 
desire for cooperative relationships, there is also the potential for them to be at odds. In 180 
particular, widely broadcast signals may be viewed with more scepticism if one is always 181 
behaving selfishly in more private interactions. More generally, there is a constant tradeoff 182 
between signalling ongoing investment to a particular partner and signalling to other 183 
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potential or current partners. While one partner may appreciate demonstrations of 184 
commitment, other partners may feel slighted that they did not receive something at the 185 
same time.  186 
 187 
Despite these tradeoffs, both signal forms contribute in distinct ways to fostering 188 
cooperative relationships, and signallers should often employ both. Because individuals 189 
differ in their own qualities as well as in the sets of relationships in which they are 190 
embedded, individuals also differ in the types of relationships they wish or need to engage 191 
in. Thus, not only do we expect individuals to employ multiple signal modalities, but the 192 
relative balance of each form of prosocial signalling will likely vary between individuals as 193 
well as within the same individual at different times. To illustrate the value of considering 194 
both dramatic broadcast and subtle dyadic signals, we now explore one type of prosocial 195 
behaviour that has been well-studied cross-culturally: food sharing.  196 
 197 
Food sharing 198 
 199 
One of the most common cross-cultural manifestations of prosocial behaviour is the transfer 200 
of food from those who acquired it to those who did not. Most applications of signalling 201 
models to sharing have focused on cases where food is made a common good, such as 202 
when hunters acquire large prey items associated with a high risk of failure, and share them 203 
widely throughout the community52–55. For example, Meriam turtle hunters send prosocial 204 
signals by giving away the entire catch to provision a public feast following a successful 205 
hunt, a signal that makes visible one's political motives and prosocial motivations53. This 206 
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sharing provides hunters with a means to send signals of support to the individual or 207 
families hosting the feast, as well as more indirect signals to those attending the feast who 208 
actually consume the turtle, which in turn benefit hunters through greater access to the 209 
sorts of alliances that translate into better marriage prospects.  210 
 211 
Although grand displays have been the focus of applications of signalling theory to food 212 
sharing, signalling models may also provide insight into less obvious forms of sharing that 213 
are commonly explained through evolutionary models of reciprocity and kin selection. These 214 
forms of sharing generally involve dyadic transfers (or transfers to only a few partners) of a 215 
small amount of food, what we might call ‘private’ sharing as opposed to public 216 
distributions, and seem to be more common among women. Hiwi women exchange 217 
identical harvests of wild tubers56; Batek men and women engage in 'unnecessary' 218 
distributions of food when it is abundant, leaving families with the same amount they 219 
started with57; Hadza women coming together for a meal while out foraging pass roasted 220 
tubers back and forth58; Meriam women sometimes share sardines between households 221 
when sardines, as well as small reef fish and shellfish, are constantly available to everyone 222 
on the foreshore59; Martu women share monitor lizards (but not vegetable foods) in a 223 
similar fashion18 (Box 1). Day-to-day sharing such as this is often assumed to be driven by 224 
the demands of contingent reciprocity or variance in individual need, but in many of these 225 
cases, food flows not only from haves to have-nots, but also between those who have 226 
identical amounts and types of resources. 227 
 228 
 11
Such sharing is puzzling for a number of reasons. First, it is seemingly low cost, and thus not 229 
consistent with 'wasteful display' signalling arguments, as only relatively small amounts tend 230 
to be transferred, and sometimes individuals end up with similar amounts of similar 231 
resources after sharing has concluded. Second, it often involves transfers of small-harvest, 232 
low-risk resources that are generally synchronously acquired, which make it unlikely that 233 
individuals are sharing in order to reduce the risk of failing to find food on any given day. 234 
Third, private sharing seems difficult to reconcile with signalling explanations that have 235 
traditionally relied on widespread advertising in which the act of generosity is directly 236 
observed by a large number of people. Instead, private sharing tends to involve direct 237 
transfers to few recipients, often in non-public contexts, which make it harder to build a 238 
widespread reputation for being a skilled or generous person. Finally, while private sharing 239 
may often be directed toward kin, it is also regularly done with non-kin, people with whom 240 
one does not have an obligation to share60. 241 
 242 
Given that private or "redundant" sharing61 is common across many societies, it seems likely 243 
that it confers benefits on those who perform it. We suggest that the value of small acts of 244 
sharing, encompassing both 'unnecessary' sharing and many other day-to-day exchanges 245 
(not just food sharing) may lie more in signals conveyed and relationships affirmed than in 246 
the specific content of the exchange. As most quantitative studies of sharing demonstrate, 247 
contingency, kinship, scrounging, and other modes of sharing explain only a small 248 
proportion of most sharing transfers62, suggesting that considerations of social relationships 249 
between individuals may account for types of sharing that are not well accounted for by 250 
classic models. This accords with sharers' own accounts of their actions: in many of these 251 
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cases, individuals talk about these small transfers not in terms of reciprocity (or even status 252 
gains), but in terms of morality, and the ethics of being a 'good person'58,59,63,64. In the case 253 
of subtle, dyadic food sharing, through such seemingly unnecessary transfers, recipients can 254 
infer the sharer’s cooperative intent and commitment to a relationship because these signals 255 
demonstrate that the giver values the relationship over the benefits of consuming the 256 
resource herself.  257 
 258 
Critically, while such sharing can be immediately reciprocated, these acts of sharing may be 259 
primarily motivated by the desire to ensure the availability of cooperative partners in the 260 
future through signalling a willingness to help61,65. The benefits of such relationships are 261 
manifested in varied, sometimes subtle ways, that do not reflect a strict accounting of 262 
transfers given and received. These benefits might include risk mitigation (e.g., aid during 263 
illness)23,61, small economies of scale (e.g., turn-taking in tasks like wood collection or 264 
childcare)66, and reduced stress24. People may not maintain these types of interpersonal 265 
relationships for these specific purposes, but rather invest in their social networks to more 266 
generally increase the likelihood of positive future impacts. 267 
 268 
Conclusions and Future Directions 269 
 270 
Signals should be understood inherently as attempts to influence others67, and an important 271 
way to influence others is not just to show off abilities or physical qualities, but also to 272 
convey something about one’s willingness to help. Expanding our focus from costly signals 273 
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of an individual’s quality to more subtle signals of relational properties offers several ways 274 
forward in understanding both sharing in particular, and social systems more generally.  275 
 276 
First, focusing on how signals can demonstrate cooperative intent or the properties of 277 
relations not just to a group but to specific partners encourages us to consider other types 278 
of interactions: the everyday, the subtle, and the cumulative, rather than attending solely to 279 
showy or solitary events. This further directs us to study the whole signal system, and to 280 
extend studies past isolated, short term, or one-off interactions. This can be facilitated by 281 
experimental work that considers realistic social contexts beyond simple anonymous 282 
games68–70, by modelling work that better situates agents within chains of multiple 283 
interaction types71–73, and critically, by long-term field projects that allow for a close and 284 
continued study of behaviour over time17,74. 285 
 286 
Second, if signalling is involved in subtle acts directed at specific others, this encourages us 287 
to focus on the complete range of actors and the mix of signals that they employ. As our 288 
food sharing example suggests, a focus on dyadic signalling of cooperative intent, in 289 
addition to broadcast signalling, may bring new attention to women’s social strategies, 290 
which have often been neglected75. The goals and constraints that individuals face, as well 291 
as their positions within broader social networks, are variable and mutable. These factors 292 
shape the kinds of cooperative dilemmas that individuals are trying to solve (e.g., finding 293 
new or maintaining existing partners, as well as different kinds of cooperative tasks). More 294 
work should focus on how an individual’s position and needs might shape the signalling 295 
strategies she employs, and how those decisions translate into differential benefits for 296 
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individuals with different social goals. The tools of social network analysis, especially those 297 
being newly developed for temporal and multilayered network data76, provide an important 298 
methodological tool for documenting this process: both for concretely articulating the sets 299 
of relationships within which individuals are embedded, and for tracing out the 300 
consequences of their actions on these relationships77. Already, anthropologists have started 301 
to look at networks of food sharing and social support78–83, and some have begun to 302 
consider the role of signalling in these relationships74,84–86. Future work should consider how 303 
multiple signal forms, variably employed by different actors, correlate with different social 304 
outcomes.  305 
 306 
Finally, focusing on subtle signals shows how many signals may be aimed not (or not solely) 307 
at conveying quality, but rather focused on conveying relationship commitment. This is in 308 
large part because signal receivers (whether observing broadcast or dyadic signals) are 309 
interested in ascertaining how that signaller is likely to act towards them in subsequent 310 
interactions. While the signaller’s attributes and qualities are relevant in that determination, 311 
so too is an assessment of the essence of their relationship to date and the degree to which 312 
the signaller has committed to future interactions. As our examples of “redundant” food 313 
sharing make clear, a dry accounting of material exchanges fails to capture the longer-term 314 
importance of the relationships formed through these short-term swaps. Indeed, this insight 315 
echoes a long history of debate over whether exchange is about the movement of goods, or 316 
is better viewed as a process that creates social relationships87. Concluding that prosocial 317 
acts are “explained” if and when they are reciprocated may not be congruent with what 318 
actually motivates the behaviour and fails to account for the fact that the information 319 
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conveyed through a prosocial act may be more important than the material content of the 320 
exchange. Similarly, seeing sharing among relatives as "explained" by the fitness benefits 321 
derived through fostering the well-being of close kin ignores the work that must be done 322 
over time to maintain those social ties.  323 
 324 
One analytical frame that potentially has more purchase than seeing each partnership as a 325 
series of reciprocated exchanges is that of social capital, which defines the potential 326 
relationships and resources an individual has to call upon. Future work should investigate 327 
how an individual’s various prosocial signals may influence her social capital. Here, too, 328 
network analysis holds particular promise, in that it allows for multiple renderings of an 329 
individual’s network social capital20, which may be differentially influenced by different 330 
prosocial signals. Broadcast prosocial signals, for example, may be most crucial for 331 
increasing network degree23, while dyadic signals may have more effect on tie strength; both 332 
likely contribute to an individual’s position within a network. Dyadic signals that are 333 
accompanied by unbalanced resource flows, demonstrating a lack of interest in account-334 
keeping, may have more effect on tie strength between actors and produce more social 335 
capital, greater trust, and a greater likelihood of cooperation than those that are 336 
accompanied by more contingency in giving. Ultimately, we feel that situating each 337 
individual’s actions within their broader social and temporal context, and rendering 338 
relationships rather than economic transactions or simple kinship benefits, will advance a 339 
more realistic view of the mechanisms that sustain cooperation.  340 
 341 
 342 
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Figure 1. Martu cooperative hunting network. 343 
This network diagram depicts the cooperative hunting network of Martu small animal 344 
hunters. Red nodes are women; yellow are men; the ties between nodes are sized according 345 
to the frequency with which each person cooperated with each other, while the nodes 346 
themselves are sized according to observed generosity with meat. 347 
 348 
 349 
BOX 1: Martu women’s sharing 350 
 351 
Martu women’s sharing of small animals provides some insight into how subtle, sequentially 352 
dyadic transactions can send signals of cooperative intent17,18. Women, especially older 353 
women, spend most of their time hunting sand monitor lizards and other small reptilian and 354 
mammalian prey in the sand plains of the Western Desert of Australia. When women hunt, 355 
they form temporary camps away from the community, hunt alone or cooperatively, and 356 
assemble at the camp at the end of the day. At camp, they cook their harvests of around 2 357 
kg of lizards each, and share with all those sitting around the fire. These sorts of harvests 358 
make up nearly 40% of the bushmeat that people consume on a daily basis, and women are 359 
successful 90% of the time. But on 23% of hunts, a successful hunter will take nothing for 360 
herself. More than 70% of the time, these harvests of small, synchronously acquired prey are 361 
shared well beyond their own families. The sharing itself proceeds in very unexpected ways: 362 
women exchange identical lizards, and the hunter will always give away the largest prey to 363 
someone else to distribute. While the goal is to distribute meat evenly among all present 364 
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(regardless of how hard anyone worked or how much they acquired), those who produced 365 
more that day usually end up with slightly less than everyone else, and this is the goal. By 366 
sharing in a slightly (but relatively) costly way, a productive hunter distances herself from the 367 
benefits she might achieve with her production; by sharing equally to freeloaders, other 368 
productive women, and hardworking but unlucky hunters, and by not distributing very large 369 
prey herself, a woman also distances herself from any hint that she is sharing only to receive 370 
something in return. The benefits of such sharing come in the form of greater access to 371 
cooperative partnerships, but only to those who share a higher percentage of what they 372 
acquire. Those who merely produce large harvests (and share some, but not proportionately 373 
more), while they may be considered skillful hunters, do not reap the rewards of generosity 374 
in the form of greater access to more generous cooperative hunting partners. 375 
 376 
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